“WHO ARE EUROPE’S FARMERS?” ACCESSION TO THE EU AND ORGANIZED PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS EVIDENCE FROM THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Iglika YAKOVA*

Introduction

During the past decade Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone dramatic changes. Two events are particularly important. First, with the collapse of state-socialism, most of these countries became committed to the liberalization of their political and economic systems. Another important event in the past decade was the accession of CEECs to the European Union (EU). It brought challenges in terms of conditionality and asymmetrical relationships between old and new member states (Grabbe 2003). As such, accession to the EU has been presented as an incremental process, a tool for reform and an objective for candidate countries (Agh 2004). In this context, the process of accession to the EU has greatly influenced not only the development of institutions and policies, but also the evolution of actors, including special interest or civil society groups. This was performed through the rapid adoption of new, Western type, institutions and the adoption of the common EU legislative body, the *acquis communautaire*. While there are many studies on the Europeanization of national policy systems, institutions and interest groups in old member states (Radaelli 2000, Green Cowlies, Caporaso and Risse 2001, Börzel and Risse 2000, Falkner 1999), few studies have investigated how accession to the EU challenges interest groups in countries preparing for EU membership. Thus, the study of interest groups in EU former candidate countries (the current new members of the EU) is an important tool for understanding the mechanisms of Europeanization in non-governmental actors during the negotiations process and their role in the policy making process.

The main objective of this study is to explore the usage of ‘Europe’ by professional intermediators and what the mechanisms of this usage are. I will analyze the effect of the European factor (Olsen 2002) on domestic organized interests (Kohler-Koch 2002), as Radaelli describes it, in order to better understand changes and development of new structures and identification strategies of organized agricultural interest groups in Central Europe. The policy network approach, specifically the agricultural policy community as a relationship between organized interests and state actors, can be fruitful in finding research models (Börzel 1997, Kohler-Koch 2002) allowing us to understand professional intermediation in post-communist Europe. In other words, I have tried to assess how external and internal factors have interacted in the agricultural policy community at the national level, and what the consequences are on interests, strategies and ideology. The policy

---

*Iglika Yakova, iyakova@aya.yale.com. I would like to thank Prof. Iván Szelényi, Adam Sheingate and Gerald Creed for their useful comments on an earlier version of the article presented for the Fifteenth International Conference, Council for European Studies, Chicago, April 2006. I am also thankful to three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions for the restructuring of the paper. I was supported by the Fox International Fellowship 2005-2006 at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Yale University.*
community can be relatively flexible or closed. I analyze national, transnational and supranational strategies during three different time periods, i.e. before the official opening of negotiations in 1998, during accession negotiations until full EU membership of the Czech Republic in May 2004, and once the full membership had taken place.

I selected agricultural policy as the empirical context to examine the modalities of interest groups in EU candidate countries. Gorton, Lowe, and Zellei (2005) identify pre-accession Europeanization in different stages in the field of environmental policy, while Franz Gatzweiler (2005) argues that institutional change in the agri-environmental field was influenced by three major forces, namely, evolution, path dependence, and the rapid adoption of new Western institutions and EU models. Thus it would be useful to assess what the impact is of these other forces on agricultural interest groups during the three stages described above. The empirical evidence for this paper comes from data collected within the framework of my PhD thesis. My analyses have been based on research performed in the Czech Republic and in Brussels, Belgium. I was granted access to documentation and have been able to corroborate this material through interviews with different actors. I use qualitative methods to unveil the multi-faceted accession process of the EU (e.g. semi-structured in-depth interviews with farmers, NGO activists, regional officials, public and European administrators, researchers). These semi-structured interviews were conducted on three different levels of governance: local, national and European. The reasons for this empirical selection are as follows. Firstly, EU agricultural policy is characterized by deeply entrenched interests on the national and supranational levels, such as farmers’ interests, consumers’ or environmental concerns, WTO and external trade obligations. Key actors within the European agricultural policy community include professional mediators, administrative agencies, governments, EU actors, experts, NGOs and advocacy groups. Secondly, pressure for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and WTO obligations have brought forward a new distribution of power and access not only in Brussels but at the domestic level as well. As such, the Common Agricultural Policy can be considered a ‘moving target’. I will explore how the realities of the EU interact with legacies of the past in post-communist countries, thus creating new resources for professional mediators. My question deals with actors and their structures, strategies, and ideology. How does the EU impact organized interests in candidate countries? Is there a relationship between post-communist legacy and the influence of the EU in the organization of professional interests?

Domestic actors have used ‘Europe’ under EU pressure during the process of accession negotiations, but they have used it in the absence of adaptation pressure during a first period of establishment of new interests groups and of learning of Western models, which preceded the negotiations with the City Hall. During the negotiations period, competing mediators used the EU in order to strengthen their domestic identity, to mobilize resources and to diversify repertoires of action. Moreover, specific domestic structures present in the agricultural sector establish a specific path of development. There is a continuation of old patterns of elite participation, whereby privatization strengthens the hand of the old nomenclature and other legacies of the past.

The paper is organized as follows: section 1 presents concepts and definitions on interest groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Section 2 explains the empirical
outline, and finally section 3 deals with the EU’s impact on path dependent institutions and new structure.

**Concepts and Definitions**

As an analytical tool, I use the term ‘Europeanization’ to describe the impact of the European intervening factor at the domestic level in EU candidate countries thus adapting CEECs interest groups to a European model, logic or a constraint. C. Radaelli (2000) defines Europeanization as:

> A process of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of rules, procedure, paradigms, styles, ways of doing and shared beliefs and norms, formal and informal, defined and consolidated first in the decision-making process of the EU and then incorporated in the logic discourses, identities, political structure and policies at the domestic level.

I define ‘professional intermediators’ as specialized mediators invested in a monopolistic representation of collective interests, who take part in a political decision making process as exclusive partners and have the power to influence their membership. Alan Cawson (1986) reminds us that interest intermediation is not equivalent to the notion of interest representation. The latter was used by Philippe Schmitter (1979) to explain the reciprocity of relations between corporatist organizations and state agencies. As such, representation is not the unique objective of the interest group; it can only be one part of its functions. By using the term ‘interest intermediation’, Schmitter also reiterates the fact that associations do not always translate their members’ interests and that often they do not respond to grassroots preferences while playing an important role in educating their members about their political interests. Thus, an interest group is a self-interested entity that seeks to represent particular collective interests and to influence the political process in a specific domain. Interest groups are not political organizations even though they can take part in political activities, and they can have direct or indirect links with political parties. In the context of agriculture, political affiliation and links with political parties and parliamentary committees are crucial as they guarantee access and participation.

During state-socialism, the most frequently found type of organizations of professional interest were the corporatist organizations, i.e. groups of technocrats (*nomenklatura*), trade unions and old apparatchiks in the industrial sector. Over the years, their roles were transformed into those of negotiation agents, within the central planning framework. State-run associations held a monopoly position. Consequently, the intermediation of economic and social interests was not totally absent. During the transformation period, it was possible to build new institutions, but these too were influenced by the legacy of the previous system. They had implicit links with the State which had organized their structures and often determined their limited political access. In the case of professional associations after 1990, some of the structures already existed. Consequently, they also had to adapt to new rules and gain credibility in a new political system. The rapid changes that interest groups underwent in the past fifteen years of political and economic transformation not only showed to what extent they were dependent on the state, but also highlighted the weakness of their structures,
the lack of resources and capital. New and old associations often competed ideologically with each other on the basis of their link to the state-socialist regime.

**Interest Intermediation: Empirical Outline**

Agriculture in the Czech Republic bears the legacy of a typical large collectivized sector. Czech interest groups in the field of agriculture have been chosen for this analysis because of a specific type of collectivized agriculture and privatization process. Czech agriculture, with its small share of GDP, dual farm structure and competing agricultural associations, is a typical case for analyzing the Europeanization of agricultural interest groups in new EU member states. The Czech agricultural sector is small, and the trends seen there are similar to current agricultural trends in Western Europe: The Czech economic indicators are similar to those in the EU 15 member states (see annex). Also, the Czech population mainly lives in rural areas but is primarily engaged in industry and the services sector.

Organizations of professional associations followed a path of duality according to specific patterns of agricultural transformation, i.e. big entrepreneurial companies versus small semi-subsistence farming. Other forms of ownership have emerged from the former co-operatives and state farms. Nowadays, farm land is distributed as follows: corporate farms - 44%, co-operatives - 26.3%; individual private farms - 27.4%. More than 80% of agricultural land is cultivated by big size farms (500 ha and more), representing only 7.5% of the total number of farmers. Representation of these economic entities has been organized though the Agrarian Chamber, the Agricultural Association and the Association of private farming.

I have observed the Czech Chamber of Agriculture and associations - partners from their creation until the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. I will introduce here as well the two main professional associations: the Agricultural Association (AA), which represents mostly large scale agricultural enterprises (more than 500 ha), and the Association of Private Farming (APF), which represents smaller individual farms (approximately 100 ha).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of farms (ha)</th>
<th>% of farms</th>
<th>% of agricultural land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 50</td>
<td>81,3</td>
<td>6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 100</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 - 500</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>10,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 - 1000</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>15,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001 - 2000</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>31,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 -</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>33,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech Chamber of Agriculture 2001

**The Agrarian Chamber**

In 1991, the Czech Parliament passed a law on professional chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture. Under this law, the new Chamber took over many tasks distributed among various government agencies: mainly registration, regulation, and training. While membership in the Agrarian Chamber (CAC:
http://www.agrocr.cz) today is voluntary, it was compulsory during the first two years after its establishment. The Chamber encompasses 71 district agrarian chambers and 59 professional organizations, which include approximately 77,000 physical entities (entrepreneurs) and 7,600 legal entities (farming companies). The Chamber was modelled after the Austrian/German system with compulsory membership and strong regional representation but it is also a successful model of an old pattern of elite participation on the regional level, and a recent socialist model of top-down control of authoritarian/state-corporatism (Ingleby 1996). The CAC is the main actor involved in constant negotiations with government officials, research institutes, universities, parliamentary committees and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Chamber is interested in increasing agricultural production. It aims to negotiate better quota limits and to have equal rights to subsidies as other EU farmers. Its main interest is EU or national funding for the sector. It lobbies for an increase of direct payments, rather than rural development measures. The Chamber seeks to convey an image of a group which is a leader, a unifier and a representative of the whole agricultural community in the Czech Republic.

The Agricultural Association

The Agricultural Association of the Czech Republic (AA: http://www.zemsvazpraha.cz) was officially founded under this name in 2001. It is the successor of the big and powerful Association of Co-operative Farming. The AA’s success was guaranteed through the careful provision of domestic and external resources. The European influence was used in combination with social capital, and ex-communist elite networking. The association has been transformed several times since the 1990s. During state-socialism, the association promoted the state’s policies and communicated state decisions to the farmers. It has close links with the Chamber of Agriculture at the local, national and EU level and as such, both organizations are often associated with one another. Even though in the first years after 1990 it did not succeed in influencing agricultural policy making, the election of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) in 1998 made it possible for the association to shape agricultural policies through the appointment of Jan Fencl, former chair of the Association, as Minister of Agriculture. The Association is also a member of the Tripartite body for social partnership, thus representing employers in the agricultural sector. As a lobby the AA defends employers, while it also functions as the voice of agriculturalists, and it is the most powerful association in terms of economic impact. In 2004, AA members cultivated 1,349,000 ha of agricultural area, which represented 37% of the total agricultural area in the Czech Republic. The association has about 1,018 members; half of them are co-operatives, approximately one-third are joint-stock companies and around 15% are limited liability companies (Bavorova, Curtiss and Jelinek 2005).

However, the Association, being the main partner of the Chamber of Agriculture, faces a crisis of legitimacy. The AA has very strong links at the ministry and parliament, but it faces a crisis of legitimacy as it is not specialized enough and often it does not have an added value to those farmers who are not directly involved as leaders. Its ideology and interests are often similar to those of the Agrarian Chamber but the AA is much less present in the countryside. Its members are very large agricultural companies and some of their executives and leaders live in big cities. They are the most influential politically, and yet they are absent from the social activities in the countryside.
The Association of Private Farming

The Association of Private Farming of the Czech Republic (APF: http://www.asz.cz) was established in 1998 as the successor of three small associations defending the interests of small restituted land owners and victims of land collectivization. The interests of the association are to promote family farming and to further the role of family farming in modern agriculture and the countryside. The APF has a conservative orientation and ties with the right-wing Civic Democratic Party and its Members of Parliament. The members of the APF owned a combined 300,000 ha of agricultural area in 2003, which corresponds to 7% of the total agricultural land. It represented approximately one third of the area cultivated by individual farmers. The association has about 3,100 members, which means that the average cultivated area per member farmer is approximately 100 ha. However, many small individual farmers are not even registered in the local “Agricultural Register” as food producers. The number of those individual farmers registered in the “Agricultural Register” and who can be counted as market-oriented farmers, exceeds tenfold the number of APF members (Bavorova, Curtiss and Jelinek; 2005). Thus, free-riding is a big problem for the association because members are few but a majority of Czech farmers can take advantages of the policy achievements. The APF is not a member of the Agrarian Chamber. This reduces its political and economic impact. Its members left the Chamber and adopted an outsider strategy because of ideological competition between the leaders and rival interests in the policy making process. The leader of the association is ideologically opposed to the president of the Chamber because he represents big agricultural structures and former cooperatives. Important disputes have arisen on issues regarding decollectivization, former links with the communist party, and debts of cooperatives. The APF also protested against the big farms, which are considered the winners of the privatization process. APF members are very active in local politics, but have difficulties being included in the national policy making process. Their main strategy consists of recalling the past, specifically by condemning the communist elite, through efficient media communication. The leaders of the APF see their role as a balancing power against the big farms, and cooperatives in general. They highlight their distinctiveness in relation to the controversial communist past:

“I am a member of the association since its very beginning. I know how it evolved. This association is different because it serves the needs of private farmers… in order to counteract cooperatives and to balance the influence of big cooperatives. I am not a member of any other association, I am not a member of the Chamber, and on the contrary I am against it [the Chamber].”

Throughout our observations, I conclude that the APF is based at the local level, and receives its legitimacy from its role as representative of small farms whose concerns are rural social issues. At the local level this agricultural association found a new role as a translator and mediator of European norms and legislation. This and its relatively large membership notwithstanding, the APF is less influential in the parliament and the ministry, due to the low economic impact of its members. This is also due to the various political and personal orientations of the leaders of the APF. Yet, even if members of the APF are often excluded from the policy making process
because of political agendas and alliances, they have gained a certain amount of legitimacy through their European activities and their readiness to implement EU programs locally (SAPARD in particular). Thus, municipalities engaged in cooperation projects were the main beneficiaries, together with big agricultural companies. Small farms however had difficulty in receiving funds.

Path dependent institutions and new associations

During the period of the economic transformation when agricultural groups were established, some new Western types of structures were copied and some were based on old patterns of elite participation and legacies of the past. During the EU negotiations, coercion mechanisms widely contributed to the inclusion of associations within the agricultural policy community in the domestic context, thus transforming their collective strategies, directing their interest towards EU policy making and guaranteeing their role as legitimized mediators. After 2004, accession to the EU triggered another role for professional associations, allowing them, through the diffusion of EU norms, to participate in the policy making process, at the domestic and EU levels. However, local interests and regional rural development remain problematic. This will be shown through an analysis of the evolution of structures, interests and strategies of the main associations.

1990: Preparations for Europe?

Building new interest groups in a new economic system is a learning experience. During international meetings, conferences and seminars, agricultural associations copied models, exchanged knowledge and experiences with their Western counterparts, mainly neighbouring countries such as Austria and Germany.

During the first years of social and economic change, collectivized Czech agriculture struggled for survival under dire economic conditions. Competing rural and agricultural associations represented the different interests involved in restitution of collectivized land and property, privatization, and transformation of cooperatives or state farms. Hence, agricultural interests were articulated around the issue of land and property, or the issues of losers and winners of the agricultural reforms after decollectivization. The struggles over land property in the post-Socialist countryside are not only about material resources but also about social and moral values (Sikor 2005: 189). Actors motivate their claims by asserting primacy over historical justice, symbolic compensation for victims or the efficiency of “the market” and their role as “entrepreneurs”. Throughout the period of decollectivization, privatization and consolidation of land rights, a dual structure of farms was put into place (Doucha 2004). Even if big companies or cooperative farms were not competitive enough, they managed to restructure successfully though copying. The most popular models were those of the Austrians and the Germans.

For instance, the Czechs adopted an Austrian model for their Chamber of Agriculture and for the Institute for Research in Agrarian Economics. The Austrians had been interested in presenting their model of agricultural intermediation and had suggested it for implementation in the CEECs at several transnational conferences. Not only did this reflect the conviction that corporatist structures better respond to the needs of these new free market societies, but it also indicated a desire to introduce small scale family farming into CEECs. This was influenced, among other things, by
a growing concern about rural development, values of family farming and the social role of farmers.

The establishment of Agrarian Chambers in some CEECs was also influenced by the German neighbours: a regional structure was created and local representatives were put in place where they never existed before. However, the first model did not correspond to the situation of agricultural entities in Czechoslovakia, and in the Czech Republic in particular. This type of model was eventually chosen by the Czechs during the creation of the Chamber in 1991. So, compulsory membership was quickly replaced by voluntary membership. There were no elections based on the local distribution of farmers, but the Chamber works through its local offices (similar to the situation in Hungary). In fact, the experts who came to Prague were also Germans. In the second tour of the EU twinning programs, Czech associations chose to have Irish experts as partners. One of the reasons given for this was that they wanted to learn from another new member state (as opposed to the Germans, who are founding members of the EU) how to use EU funding. Moreover, the other European experts had shown a preference to establishing links with Polish and Hungarian partners, relishing the prospect of tighter trade relations. They were less interested in Czech farming.

Representing large entrepreneurial entities, the Agricultural Association and its members are nowadays the winners of the agricultural privatization and consolidation. The association managed to restructure successfully, it changed its name and removed the words “cooperative” and “collectivized”. It is now a modern EU type lobby based on an organizational structure copied from the National Farmers’ Union in the UK and Northern Ireland. The only association which was created from the bottom up and that is based in local initiatives, with the help of political interests, is the Association of Private Farming.

1998: The pre-accession process: asymmetric relations

The period of EU negotiations was mainly asymmetrical and imposed hierarchically. I argue that the relation of Eastern and Western associations through a common model of behaviour was asymmetrical during the first years of transformation (copying of structures, procedures and behaviour) but later on, the relationship became more balanced and mutually beneficial. I argue that PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) program has been used for the transfer of informal norms from EU member states representing their sectoral and professional domestic cultures.

The PHARE program mainly recruited teams of private consultants in order to organize the transmission of know-how. Its goal was to help candidate countries in their preparation for accession, according to their need for consolidating institutions and implementing the acquis. Contacts with agricultural associations were organized through COPA-COGECA (the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in the European Union, the General Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union), and it was implemented almost exclusively within the framework of twinning programs between different partners, national administrations and experts in neighbouring countries. COPA-COGECA had a privileged position that it sought to keep after the fifth enlargement. Indeed, since 1995 COPA anticipated the enlargement and aimed to consolidate agricultural associations in Central and Eastern
Europe in order to better integrate them afterwards. The above-mentioned associations were in a crisis situation, threatened by the enlargement of the EU, while the Eastern Europeans also faced a crisis of representation and reconstruction.

The Europeanization of associations in CEECs was not only vertical, i.e. coming from a higher EU authority, but was also horizontal, created through a common learning process in terms of lobbying techniques, access to information, influence and repertoires of action. Social learning (Checkel 1999) is possible in groups where individuals shared a common professional background: they were all farmers. It is made possible when the group feels it is in a crisis or is faced with clear evidence of policy failure (challenges of COPA and transformations in CEECs). It is more likely to occur when a group meets repeatedly and where there is a high level of interaction among participants (for instance through twinning initiatives or conferences, workshops and exchanges). Priority has been given to bilateral exchanges between two partners. The change is visible in terms of access to power, the creation of alliances (e.g.: the new Visegrad initiatives, and alliances of small farmers across the EU), learning of a specific behaviour in Brussels, a better knowledge of the specificities of each partner, and also challenging the monopoly of COPA-COGECA. A reciprocal relationship was thus imposed. “COPA cannot accept to lose us. This is a political question of representativity. […] COPA would not speak on behalf of 25 EU members anymore.”.

This was considered a pedagogical lesson towards organizations in CEECs: how to work together and cooperate at the EU level. However, these organizations were not willing to simply unite into national alliances, as distinctions between old and new types of organizations persisted and were even accentuated.

2004: Accession to the EU: usage of ‘Europe’

Accession to the EU did not halt the trend of development of agricultural associations; on the contrary, it only strengthened it. The Chamber of Agriculture and the Agricultural Association are the main groups representing major interests in the Czech agricultural sector. The AA does support a competitive liberalized agricultural sector coupled with financial support measures to farmers, equivalent to the one given to their West European counterparts. In economic terms, AA represents the biggest part of Czech agriculture, and it is interested in economic incentives for large production. The Association of Private Farming still has recognition and is accepted at the negotiations table because of the high symbolic social value of its members, and because of the importance of small semi-subsistence farming in Czech Republic. What is even more important is that the APF has managed to remain effectively involved at the local level and is an intermediary with local officials and leaders. Have these evolutions contributed to a different representation of the associations? A leader of the APF argues on 2005 that they did not have an alternative, they had to deal with Europe. The APF recommends a type of agriculture more related to rural life, protection of the environment and the social role of farmers in the countryside. Because of the magnitude of the free-rider effect, it does not represent the majority of individual and family farming, but the organization gives an important voice to rural concerns.
**Concluding remarks**

This paper studied domestic change and the influence of the EU integration process in the field of interest intermediation in CEECs. Domestic actors have used ‘Europe’ even in the absence of direct EU pressure. Associations who had links with the previous regime (in terms of the communist legacy) have proven to be very successful. In the EU context these actors are embedded in and affected by the social institutions with which they interact. They have inherited the old patterns of elite participation and have managed to transfer them into other, more reliable, EU-pragmatic resources. At the local level small associations involved in rural activities would seek to promote a ‘rural’ role of the profession related to recent reforms of CAP, while bigger farmers would seek to promote an image of entrepreneurs, thus taking advantage of the export schemes of CAP. Among the two main professional groups in Czech Agriculture, both were able to become mediators. One combines issues of local development with vertical EU lobbying; the other interest group is interested in domestic lobbying and in international markets.
References


