Governing Global South–North Organic Food Exporting: Possibilities for Democratic Engagement and Impacts for Smallholder Farmers

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Abstract. Export of certified organic agricultural products is one of a number of market-based development strategies for improving the socio-economic and ecological realities of smallholders in the Global South. Yet the outcomes of participation in these export-led initiatives have been mixed. The extent to which organic export agriculture might deliver benefits to smallholders is, at least in part, related to the deliberative capacity of organic governance processes – on which participation in organic exporting relies. Deliberative capacity is taken to include broadly inclusive and authentic inclusion of smallholders, and other local actors, in organic governance processes. This article contributes to understandings of participation in organic governance and its outcomes by evaluating smallholder and other Southern actor engagement in three aspects of organic governance arrangements: organic standards, compliance and inspection requirements. The results presented here – drawing from fieldwork in Uganda and Ghana – demonstrate that, on the one hand, organic governance arrangements are characterized by limited democratic engagement and decision-making; standard-setting processes largely exclude smallholder and other Southern actor interests, as well as creating new forms of dependency between smallholders and export companies. However, and in other circumstances, the introduction of group certification and local inspection services has provided smallholders with bargaining power with export companies and northern buyers. These spaces point to possibilities for organic governance to improve the socio-economic and ecological realities of smallholders in the Global South.

Introduction

Pathways for ‘development’ in the Global South frequently situate the globalization of rural land and labour as central to economic growth. This ‘global development’ agenda has delivered socio-economic and ecological problems for Southern smallholder farmers, and exacerbated domestic food insecurity and food import dependence in many countries and regions (Bello, 2009; FAO, 2010; McMichael, 2010). Yet despite its limits, especially in terms of its capacity to deliver national and local-level...
food security, global development is normalized and institutionalized via a range of regulatory and policy frameworks, and demonstrated in a range of contemporary processes, including international trade, foreign direct investment and the so-called global land grabs (McMichael, 2010, 2013; Cotula, 2012). Responses – and resistance – to this development model are varied. On the one hand, civil society, smallholder farmers, consumers/citizens and researchers have coalesced in a diversity of alternative food networks and food sovereignty movements, including those that aim to localize markets, shorten agri-food supply chains, and support peasant and subsistence agriculture (Whatmore et al., 2003; Whittman et al., 2010; Holt Giménez and Shattuck, 2011). A number of Southern and Northern actors have also sought to improve export markets by embedding socially and environmentally sustainable practices, including via the formation of alternative agri-food standards. Organic food and farming standards are amongst these. In recent years the certified organic sector has experienced significant growth in the Global South. While there remain gaps in the data related to organic production, the FAO (1999) predicted an expansion in South–North organic trade of 20% each year and as an outcome of this expansion, an estimated 10% of the world’s organic farmers are now located on the African continent, with most of these smallholders (Parrott and Marsden, 2002; Bouagnimbeck, 2008; Willer and Kilcher, 2011). The majority of Africa’s certified organic produce is sold on export markets, demonstrating the emphasis on certified organic agriculture as a ‘trade not aid’ approach to development, as well as the limited presence of domestic organic markets and local alternative food-trading networks (for example, see Freidberg and Goldstein, 2010).

The expansion of African organic exporting raises a number of obvious tensions. For example, some food justice activists have argued export-led agriculture reduces the land and labour available to ensure local and/or national food security, as well as tying smallholder livelihoods to the whims of Northern consumer preferences, corporate actors, and organic certification requirements (for example, see Freidberg, 2004; Parrott et al., 2006; Lyons et al., 2012). Some within the organic movement have also opposed African organic exporting on the basis of concerns that airfreight of organic food (and the associated carbon emissions) is antithetical to the core environmental principles of the organic movement. This ‘food miles’ debate coalesced in 2007 when the UK Soil Association proposed organic standards would prohibit the use of airfreight for transport of organic produce. While the UK Soil Association subsequently dropped this proposal, thereby appearing to respond to broad calls for social and economic justice for African smallholder farmers via participation in international organic markets, many unresolved questions and tensions remain.

It is in this contested terrain around South–North organic exporting this research is located. In this article, I examine the extent to which the expansion of export-led certified organic agriculture opens space for authentic and inclusive forms of deliberative democracy (see Dryzek, 2009), and with outcomes that might enable smallholder farmers and other Southern actors to shape their socio-economic and ecological realities, including the outcomes of their participation in export markets. To assess this, empirical data are drawn from research in Uganda and Ghana, countries that have undergone varying degrees of expansion in organic exporting across commodities and sectors.

The results presented suggest mixed outcomes in terms of smallholders’ and other Southern actors’ deliberative capacity. On the one hand, the analysis demonstrates the certified organic sectors in Uganda and Ghana are sustained, to a great
extent, via the exclusion of Southern actors (including national organic peak bodies, civil society and farm groups) in general from the governance of organic agriculture, and smallholders in particular. This is demonstrated in the dominance of Northern actors in defining both organic governance arrangements and the content of organic standards; and the limited extent to which Ugandan and Ghanaian organic farm and civil society organizations and smallholders have succeeded in shaping organic agri-food export networks in ways that represent their socio-economic and ecological interests. As such, the claims of development agencies and corporate actors related to the impacts for smallholders associated with participation in organic exporting are often disconnected from the lived realities of smallholders themselves.

However, and at the same time, some organic farm and civil society organizations and smallholder farmers have negotiated aspects of the terms of their participation in export markets, including their relationships with export buyers. The formation of a smallholder group certification scheme and local inspection arrangements has been central in establishing the conditions for this deliberative capacity. In these contexts, actors have been able to shape aspects of both the processes, and outcomes, of alternative organic agri-food initiatives. This bargaining power of organic smallholders and other Southern actors represents what Friedmann and McNair (2008) refer to as ‘cracks’ in international trade deliberations, providing potential new pathways to ensure trade relationships are equitable and socially just.

**Global Agri-food Development and Democratic Engagement**

Agri-food systems are characterized by ongoing technological, economic and sociocultural transformation. In recent decades, this transformation and restructuring has been shaped significantly by structural adjustment, modernization and industrialization (see McMichael, 2010, 2013). The production and consumption relations that underpin the corporate food regime that has emerged from this transformation are shaped by corporate markets and global value chains, and mediated via global private standards and regulations (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; McMichael, 2010; Oya, 2012). This regime is also underpinned by mantras of growth and productivity, which in turn drives further technological innovation across the agriculture and food sectors.

The policies and practices underpinning the corporate food regime shape the global development project, and further integrate smallholder and peasant farmers into cash cropping and export markets; including as suppliers of ‘dessert’ commodities such as bananas, sugar, cacao and coffee, as well as non-traditional and out-of-season crops, including cut flowers and winter vegetables to Northern markets (Freidberg, 2004; Dolan, 2008; Holt Giménez et al., 2009). This transformation from traditional and/or domestic production, to production for export markets, has occurred unevenly across temporal, geographic and social locations (Borras et al., 2008, p. 170). Despite this variation, general trends emerging from these restructuring processes demonstrate growing import dependence and food deficits for countries in the South, the results of which have greatly reduced Southern farmers’ capacity to control their food systems (Holt Giménez et al., 2009). The expansion of the corporate food regime has also reduced the viability of agroecological and low-carbon farming systems (Patel and McMichael, 2009).

Opposition to the social and ecological ruptures associated with export-led agricultural development is articulated in a diversity of alternative food networks
and food sovereignty movements (Schanbacher, 2010; Holt Giménez and Shattuck, 2011). While some of these movements are not antithetical to export agriculture, they frequently place at their core support for trade policies and practices that, first and foremost, serve the rights of people, and only after that consider food as a tradeable good.

But what form and content might trade policies and practices take so as to serve the rights of people, especially smallholder and peasant farmers in the Global South? For international peasant movement La Via Campesina this includes trade relations that are ‘appropriate to democratic conditions of food production and distribution’ (McMichael, 2005, p. 287). It is the extent to which organic export agriculture might convergence with democratic conditions, and their effectiveness in delivering social and ecological benefits to smallholders, that is the focus of this article.

While there is a range of approaches for evaluating the democratization of organic governance arrangements, and its outcomes, this article focuses on aspects related to decision-making processes. Drawing from deliberative democratic political theory, deliberation and participation are now widely recognized to be part and parcel with democratic decision-making (Dryzek, 2009; Sarkissian et al., 2009; Pretty, 2012). Proponents of deliberative democracy assert that those affected by decision-making should be engaged in dialogic processes related to such decisions, and in ways that enable them to shape the outcomes so as to reflect their social, economic, ecological and other aspirations and needs (for example, see Dryzek, 2009). While this participatory turn is widely recognized as being one of a number of mechanisms for democratizing decision-making processes, and their outcomes, it is also critiqued for failing to deliver on such promises. The ‘inclusive’ and ‘empowering’ discourses frequently associated with deliberative engagement, for example, are also criticized for masking the exclusion of certain groups – including minority groups – thereby reinforcing the interests of the most powerful (for example, see Cooke and Kothari, 2001). And after civil society and social movement (often) hard-fought victories for recognition as legitimate actors in deliberative dialogues, their inclusion in ‘insider’ deliberations may be ineffective in influencing decision-making in ways that deliver positive social and environmental changes. Participation in deliberative processes may also redirect scarce organizational resources away from other, arguably more strategic, activities (Schlosberg and Dryzek, 2002; Whelan and Lyons, 2005).

In the context of such limits, Dryzek (2009, p. 1382) has articulated some of the terms and conditions that might be required for effective and democratic dialogue and decision-making – or more broadly, what he refers to as ‘deliberative capacity’. First, he argues deliberation must be authentic, enabling participants to freely reflect on their values and beliefs, including the freedom to change one’s mind, as well as to reciprocate with others engaged in deliberative processes. Second, deliberative processes should be broadly inclusive of a diverse range of actors, representing a broad range of interests and discourses. Third, deliberative processes should result in outcomes that have consequences for decision-making.

To critically evaluate the extent to which organic exporting might engender democratic dialogue and decision-making – or more specifically, deliberative capacity – this article examines decision-making processes related to the governance of organic food and agriculture. A number of participatory and inclusive models of organic certification have emerged in recent years, including related to organic certification in the Global South, that form the basis of this analysis (see Hatanaka, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010; Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011; Lyons et al., 2012). This participatory turn
is particularly evident in the African context, and is connected with growing calls for greater inclusion of African actors in organic governance arrangements. The Lusaka Declaration on Mainstreaming Organic Agriculture into the African Development Agenda, for example – an outcome of the Second African Organic Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, 2–4 May 2012 – articulated the importance of both participatory research and collaboration with African stakeholders to ensure equivalence between African and export organic standards, including international recognition of the East African Organic Products Standard.

To date, there has been relatively little research that evaluates the various forms of deliberative decision-making processes in export organic agri-food networks, and the effectiveness and implications of these deliberative models for democratic governance (for research in related fields, see Raynolds, 2004; Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2008; Dolan, 2010; Hatanaka, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010). This article contributes towards filling this gap, by analysing the social relations that shape South–North exporting of organic agriculture produce.

More specifically, in this article I will evaluate critically the extent to which the socio-economic and ecological realities and priorities of smallholders and other Southern actors are brought to bare as part of decision-making processes, and in turn are reflected in organic standards and compliance requirements and processes. On the basis of these findings, I will assess the authenticity of claims related to democratic and participatory organic governance with the lived realities of those engaged in certified organic agriculture exporting and organic governance arrangements in the Global South.

On the one hand, South–North export relations have been repeatedly defined by their inequitable power relations, injustice and food insecurity (Holt Giménez et al., 2009; Oya, 2012). However, and at the same time, organic governance arrangements (including standard-setting, auditing, etc.) represent sites of negotiation and struggle between stakeholders from the South and North – particularly as international organic certification bodies seek to ensure organic standards are locally appropriate, meaningful and acceptable, and as international traders seek to engage local communities as part of a broader commitment to corporate social responsibility. As such, organic agri-food governance provides spaces for civic and democratic engagement, and where smallholders are – to some extent – able to occupy multiple, fluid and contested roles in shaping both the agricultural development agenda and its socio-economic and ecological outcomes (Larner and Le Heron, 2002; Gibson-Graham, 2006; DuPuis and Gillon, 2009; Raynolds, 2012). Friedmann and McNair (2008) describe these spaces of civic engagement (and contestation) as ‘cracks in the asphalt’, or openings for smallholders, farming organizations and others to assert bargaining power, thereby reshaping agriculture and food systems. Adding to this understanding, Raynolds (2012) describes such civic engagement as providing space for social regulation, where the values of diverse actors, including social movements, are able to inform organic standards. Examining these spaces of civic engagement – the focus of this article – opens up the possibilities for identifying and analysing the contingent, partial and fluid bargaining power of smallholders, and in so doing, avoids polarizing the experiences and socio-economic and ecological outcomes associated with engaging in export-led agriculture (see Oya, 2012).

This article now turns to an overview of organic agriculture governance globally. This provides the context to examine the extent to which smallholders and other Southern actors have been engaged in deliberative processes, and with outcomes
that have shaped decision-making related to organic exporting in two selected countries, Uganda and Ghana.

The Governance of Organic Agriculture

The corporate food regime has enabled the production of high-volume and, until recently, low-cost food. Yet the recent spikes in food prices (in 2007–2008, and again in 2011) – an outcome of a combination of factors, including speculative investment by finance capital, the burgeoning agrofuel industry and climate change, amongst other factors, may signify the end of cheap food (for example, see Moore, 2012). This increasingly costly (in economic, social and ecological terms) bulk and largely undifferentiated food is incompatible with the values of a growing number of producers, consumers, retailers, civil society organizations and others, who value ‘quality’, including foods differentiated on the basis of their social, environmental and animal welfare attributes. Reflecting this, in recent years there has been a significant expansion of market and non-market arrangements for the provision of quality produce, including farmers’ markets, community supported agriculture (CSA) and Slow Food movements (Donati et al., 2010), as well as the proliferation of quality governance mechanisms, including production standards, monitoring, certification and labeling (including fair trade, GLOBALG.A.P, Rainforest Alliance and organic agriculture) (Raynolds, 2004, 2012; Bacon, 2008; Jaffee and Howard, 2010; Oya, 2012). These governance mechanisms provide traceability for quality attributes across increasingly complex and distanced agri-food chains, including South–North organic export trade relationships. The emergence of organic (and other) governance arrangements is demonstrative of the so-called ‘audit culture’ that characterizes the neo-liberal governance of food and agriculture, and agriculture in the Global South is now commonly mediated by one, or a number, of these quality standards (Campbell and Le Heron, 2007; Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2008; Campbell, 2009; Lawrence et al., 2013).

This article is focused on governance arrangements for the expanding organic agriculture sector. Since the introduction of the first organic standard in 1973 by the UK Soil Association, Willer et al. (2008) estimate there are at least 468 governmental and non-governmental agencies that offer organic certification services. Organic certification is obtained (usually after a period of conversion) via proof of compliance with a set of standards, and generally with verification via third party-certification. Organic standards stipulate allowable inputs (e.g. animal manures and some natural herbicides), allowable practices (e.g. crop rotations, companion planting and animal husbandry practices), as well as prohibited substances (including synthetically derived agricultural chemicals, genetically modified organisms, and antibiotics). In addition, organic standards stipulate a range of social criteria (including reference to labour relations, gender equity and child labour) in an attempt to ensure equitable conduct as part of organic production and trade relations, as well as a range of environmental management criteria (biodiversity, soil fertility and water conservation), and detailed record keeping requirements.

Growth of Organics in the Global South

The production of organic food and agricultural commodities has grown rapidly in the Global South in recent years, with at least 90 Global South countries producing
organic products in commercial quantities, and worth an estimated USD 500 million (Barrett et al., 2002; Raynolds, 2004; Willer and Kilcher, 2011). Demonstrative of certified organic sector expansion in the Global South, in 2010 an estimated 40% of the world’s organic producers were in Asia, followed by Africa (28%) and Latin America (16%) (Willer and Kilcher, 2011). The majority of African organic produce – and the majority of organic produce from the Global South – is sold to export markets, including the European Union, the United States and Japan. Only two African nations (Egypt and South Africa) have reported sizeable domestic markets (Willer et al., 2008). The organic crops grown in Africa include fresh vegetables from Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Zambia, dried fruit from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Madagascar and Morocco, coffee from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, tea from Tanzania and Uganda, palm oil and cocoa from Ghana and olive oil from Tunisia (for a detailed list, see Bouagnimbeck, 2008).

While traditional and/or subsistence farming methods – including crop rotations, intercropping, mulching and organic pest control – are frequently described as ‘passive’ or ‘de facto’ organic (for example, see Jaffee, 2007 and Parrott and Marsden, 2002, respectively), recent growth has been recorded in the certified commercial organic sector. While de facto and certified organic farms may not demonstrate significant differences in terms of actual farming practices, certified organic farmers are required to provide proof of compliance with a set of internationally recognized agronomic, ecological and social criteria; aspects that are verified via detailed record keeping and regular farm inspections.

The expansion of certified organic agriculture and the integration of Southern farmers and smallholders into organic export markets is the focus of a growing body of agri-food and development scholarship. Prior research has examined the extent to which organic governance (alongside other factors, including the entry of corporate firms) signifies the ‘conventionalization’ of organic agriculture (for example, see Guthman, 2004; Campbell et al., 2010). Research in this area has identified the co-option of organic movement interests by powerful Northern actors and capitalist interests, and the subsequent weakening of organic standards, as well as adversely impacting farmers by introducing additional bureaucratic requirements and costs related to compliance (for example, see Buck et al., 1997; Guthman, 2004; Gómez Tovar et al., 2005; Jaffee and Howard, 2010). Bacon (2008), Gómez Tovar et al. (2005), Arora et al. (2013) and others have also examined the livelihood impacts associated with entry into certified organic agriculture, including standards compliance requirements, as well as the privileging of larger farms, while Raynolds (2004, 2012) and others have identified the dominance of Northern actors in defining the content of organic standards. There is also a growing body of work that examines the gendered dimensions of participation in certified organic markets, including related to the labour process, resource access and ownership (for example, see Lyon et al., 2010).

To date, however, there has been limited research that examines the politics of Southern actor engagement in organic governance processes (including standard-setting, auditing processes, etc.), and the extent to which such engagement might deliver democratic decision-making – or what Dryzek (2009) refers to as ‘deliberative capacity’ – thereby democratizing export trade. Through an analysis of aspects of the social relations of production related to organic governance, this research makes a contribution towards filling this gap.
Research Methods

The results presented in this article draw from an initial four months fieldwork in Uganda in 2005, one month fieldwork in Ghana in 2006, and follow-up fieldwork in Uganda for a period of between two and four weeks in 2006, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013. These countries were selected to examine Southern actors’ participation in, and experiences of, organic governance for a number of reasons. In 2005, when this research began, Uganda had the largest area under certified organic production in Africa. Uganda remains in the lead in terms of certified organic land in Africa; with 226,954 hectares of certified organic, or around 1.74% of Uganda’s total agricultural land (Willer and Kilcher, 2011). There has been significant investment in Uganda’s organic sector from development agencies, including the Swedish International Development Corporation Agency’s (SIDA) support for the Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) to facilitate organic exports (Gibbon et al., 2007). The EPOPA programme ran between 1995 and 2008 (operating in three East-African countries: Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia), and providing financial support to 30 organic export companies (Parrott et al., 2006). According to Agro Eco and Grolink (Agro Eco Louis Bolk Institute, 2009), EPOPA has supported the conversion of an estimated 30,000 smallholder farmers to organic farming practices in Uganda alone. In 2005, when fieldwork in Uganda began, EPOPA was providing financial support to at least 11 companies engaged in the export of tropical fruits, cotton, vanilla, coffee, Nile perch, tilapia, sesame and spices, with a number of additional companies in the process of obtaining organic certification (including for shea butter, essential oils and honey). Interviews were undertaken with smallholders under contract with two of these export companies – Amfri Farms (tropical fruits) and Kawacom International (coffee).

In contrast, organic agriculture in Ghana represents just 22,276 hectares, or 0.15%, of total agricultural land (Willer and Kilcher, 2011). The Ghanaian organic agriculture sector has received only a few international financial supports, including funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to establish a national peak body, the Ghana Organic Agriculture Network (GOAN). A number of large commodity traders – including the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company and the Ghana Cocoa Board – are also engaged in the production of small quantities of organic produce, alongside their much larger conventional production. An estimated 3,000 farmers were certified organic in 2006, a figure that is estimated to have grown since then, and by 2009 covered around 29,140 hectares, producing essential oils, herbs, horticultural crops, palm oil and cocoa. Interviews were undertaken with smallholder vegetable producers, cocoa and oil palm producers.

Fieldwork included in-depth interviews with over 60 women and men organic smallholders, including 40 pineapple and coffee growers in Uganda, and 20 cocoa, oil palm and mixed vegetable growers (including cabbage and tomatoes) in Ghana. In Uganda, initial fieldwork was followed up with focus group discussions with a group of 15–20 growers, who were members of an organic cooperative up until 2013. Interviews were also undertaken with a number of representatives from export companies: Amfri Farms, a domestically owned tropical fruit export company; and the international coffee trading company, Kawacom International in Uganda; and the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company, owned mostly by a single Belgian shareholder, as well as minority Ghana shareholders. In addition, interviews were conducted with representatives from the national peak organic organizations (National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda – NOGAMU, and Ghana Organic
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Agriculture Network – GOAN), as well as from national and international organic certification organizations and development agencies. It also included participant observation at a number of events, including meetings, training days and workshops, as well as textual analysis of a range of government and industry documents, including research papers, advertising and promotional print and web-based material.

The data collected as part of this research have been analysed with a focus on smallholders’ and other Southern actors’ lived experiences in the context of South–North organic governance arrangements, with a specific focus on deliberative capacity in terms of processes related to organic standard-setting, group certification and local inspection. The following discussion presents the analysis of this data.

**Democratizing Organic Governance Processes? Organic Standard-setting**

As explained earlier in this article, entry into organic export markets relies on organic certification, which is granted upon compliance with a set of organic standards. The codification of organic principles, beliefs and practices into systematic production, auditing and certification standards and requirements is not straightforward. Rather, standards are negotiated (and renegotiated) by movement and market actors, including farmers, farmers’ organizations, development agencies, processors, retailers, traders, consumer groups and others (Lockie et al., 2006; DuPuis and Gillon, 2009; Raynolds, 2012). Friedmann and McNair (2008, p. 409) have described these messy negotiations related to organic standard-setting as representing ‘arena(s) for contestation, multiplication (and) confusion’. At the same time, for DuPuis and Gillon (2009) this dialogue and/or negotiations related to the content of standards, compliance procedures and others aspects provides opportunities for actors to (re)shape the technologies of organic governance. Yet the extent to which Southern actors have been effective in shaping organic governance processes and, more broadly, the deliberative capacity of these processes appears mixed. To assess the deliberative capacity of South–North organic governance arrangements, and the impacts of this for the democratization of organic exporting, this article starts by examining the place of African smallholders, farm organizations and civil society in shaping processes related to the content of organic standards.

There is little doubt that some local actors have succeeded in ensuring their inclusion in dialogic processes alongside other international actors regarding setting organic standards. Since at least the early 2000s, for example, a number of representatives from Uganda have attended events organized by the international organic agriculture peak body, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), including conferences and trade fairs (e.g. BioFach). Yet these forms of inclusion appear to be at the lower end of the participatory spectrum (see Sarkissian et al., 2009), with Ugandan actors occupying ‘observer’ roles, and African organic produce part of an exotic ‘display’. While Ugandan actors (both people and products) are present, this passive status renders them as recipients of information, including standards, rather than engaged in active roles – including in forums where aspects of governance, including organic standard-setting, are negotiated and settled.

Yet in what appears to signify a shift from this passive recipient status, one Ugandan representative from NOGAMU – the national organic certification body – was elected to the IFOAM World Board in 2008 for a three-year term. This was alongside the appointment of four other Global South representatives, out of a total of 10 mem-
bers. In this role, the Ugandan representative of the World Board has participated in the Steering Committee of Organic Standards East Africa, as well as being a member of the regional standards working group responsible for drafting the East African Organic Standards. The engagement of this actor at the global level, including inclusion in standard-setting processes, may signify the growing capacity of Southern actors to participate in international dialogue over time.

While the inclusion of a Ugandan representative indicates an attempt to widen the scope in terms of both the actors and interests engaged in dialogic processes – aspects commensurate with that of deliberative capacity – there are significant limits in the extent to which this has translated into outcomes that are broadly representative of local interests and concerns. Despite the inclusion of a Ugandan in dialogue related to international standard-setting, for example, representatives from national organic organizations in both Uganda and Ghana, and a representative from the national organic certification organization UgoCert, lamented this appointment had delivered few impacts in terms of shaping the content of organic standards. As a result, they described organic standards falling short in terms of reflecting the interests and realities of African smallholders, and other Southern actors. The failure to recognize equivalence between Ugandan and IFOAM standards related to livestock handling demonstrates this.

Organic standards for livestock handling require animals to be reared on land that is certified organic. In Northeast Uganda, the Karamojong – an ethnic group of pastoral herders that have resided in this region since the 1600s – frequently move cattle across large areas of land, not all of which is certified organic. Representatives from UgoCert and NOGAMU agree it is highly unlikely activities that could exclude land from compliance with organic standards are happening in this region where the Karamojong range their cattle. The region has been – up until very recently – characterized by political and social instability, including regular cattle raids, and is isolated from incompatible land uses such as chemical-intensive agriculture and mining. As such, UgoCert requested principles of equivalence (see Barrett et al., 2002) to enable Karamojong to obtain organic certification. A representative from UgoCert explained land that cattle were grazed on in Northeast Uganda, while not certified organic, was equivalent to certified organic land. Despite years of negotiation on this issue, IFOAM eventually rejected this proposal, a decision that has excluded some herders from obtaining organic certification. A representative from UgoCert reflected on this outcome: ‘We have no bargaining power, we have absolutely no say.’

As this case demonstrates, while representatives from Uganda’s organic sector have been included in negotiation processes related to standard-setting, including via the election of a Ugandan representative on the IFOAM World Board, they express frustrations related to their constrained positionality in terms of shaping the actual outcomes of these processes. While a Ugandan representative was present in standards negotiations, they described being constrained in their capacity to shape the content of standards. Other examples of struggles related to organic standards equivalence continue, demonstrated, for example, in the yet to be resolved negotiation process related to international equivalence for the East African Organic Products Standard (see the 2012 Lusaka Declaration on Mainstreaming Organic Agriculture into the African Development Agenda).

The challenges related to the equivalence of organic standards are demonstrative of a broader concern raised by many Ugandan and Ghanaian organic advocates: that inequitable power relations enable Northern interests to ‘speak for’ Southern
stakeholders. While the participatory turn in international organic governance has encouraged Northern organic inspectors and certifiers to ‘speak with’ Southern farmers, farmers’ organizations and organic organizations – including as part of their management of internal control and participatory guarantee audit systems, detailed further below – there was little evidence that such dialogue translated into significant shifts in terms of the actual content of organic standards. As an outcome, smallholder farmers and representatives from organic organizations frequently described organic standards as inconsistent with their lived realities.

This schism was particularly evident in discussions related to the content of social standards. A representative from UgoCert, for example, lamented that social criteria (including standards related to labour conditions, gender equity, etc.) were often irrelevant and/or culturally insensitive to local circumstances. For example, he described the emphasis of organic standards on the rights and working conditions of plantation workers. He explained, however: ‘We don’t have plantation workers in Uganda; we have thousands of smallholder farmers, who mostly don’t employ farm labour. Organic standards are yet to adequately deal with the concerns and interests of smallholders.’ This example highlights the mismatch between labour-related issues on organic farms – including the specific issues for smallholders, such as the burden of costs and time related to ensuring organic compliance for farm families with small land size and minimal income – and the content of organic standards. This disconnect is revealing, given there are such social (and economic) justice claims associated with organics that are frequently relied upon as the basis for export companies’ corporate social responsibility agenda.

This disconnect between the content of standards and smallholders’ lived realities was not only raised in relation to organic standards, but also regarding other quality standards smallholders were compliant, or undergoing compliance with. For example, a number of smallholder producers required certification with Fairtrade and Utz Kapeh to comply with export buyer requirements (see Bacon, 2008). Like organic standards, these quality standards imposed requirements some smallholders described as inappropriate. For example, at a Fairtrade standards training day for organic smallholder pineapple producers in Southwest Uganda, extension officers explained that smallholders would be required to buy gumboots as protective footwear while they worked their plots. This engendered strong opposition from smallholders – including vocal group discussion and some heckling – who were otherwise supportive of Fairtrade principles, and enthusiastic at the prospects of a price premium associated with Fairtrade certification. Yet one smallholder exclaimed: ‘Why would we buy gumboots when we can’t always afford food.’ It was not simply the cost of purchasing gumboots that elicited a strong response from smallholders, but also the widely shared view that protective footwear was neither urgent, or an important, health and safety issue. Rather, smallholders identified malaria, complications during childbirth as well as AIDS and syphilis as significant health-related issues in their community. Protective footwear was low on their list of priorities compared to making available malaria testing and anti-malarial treatments, as well as local midwives and doctors to assist women during childbirth. Even in cases where deliberative processes might enable diverse perspectives and issues to come to light – a first step towards deliberative capacity – the results presented here demonstrate these issues and concerns were constrained in terms of translation into locally relevant standards.
Similarly, organic cocoa producers in Ghana discussed inconsistencies between Fairtrade claims related to social and economic justice, and their lived realities. One older cocoa producer, for example, exclaimed: ‘How can this be fair trade? I am an old woman and I still need to work each day in the hot sun to earn money, I have no savings.’ Despite improvements in market access, Fairtrade had failed to enable this smallholder to earn sufficient income so as to instigate a savings plan that could enable her to retire from farming at an age she believed was appropriate. Rather, this farmer – and like many others – was dependent on the buyer, the Ghana Cocoa Board, for her income and livelihood, and with little space to negotiate her interests. Even with Fairtrade’s involvement, the working conditions and relationship with the buyer failed to meet this farmer’s expectations regarding a reasonable quality of life.

Overall, the evidence presented here reveals moments of Southern actor inclusion in standard-setting processes. It is evident in representation on international standard-setting committees, such as IFOAM, enabling Southern actors to engage in negotiations related to the content of organic standards. However, this appears yet to be matched by substantial changes in terms of the content of organic standards. Indeed, the results presented here demonstrate that while some Southern actors are included in standard-setting negotiations, their interests appear to be excluded from the outcomes of such dialogue (see Raynolds et al., 2007; Dolan, 2008; Lyons et al., 2012; Smith and Lyons, 2012; Raynolds, 2012). In this light, participation of Southern actors may be read as a strategy to legitimize standard-setting processes, by being seen to broaden the scope for inclusive engagement and dialogue. Yet organic (and other quality) standard-setting processes appear to fall short in terms of their deliberative capacity, leaving little room for Southern actors to play a substantial role in informing the content of organic standards in ways that better represent their lived realities, including issues and concerns.

**Shifting South–North Power Relations? Group Certification and Local Inspection**

While the experiences of smallholders and farm organizations in Uganda and Ghana related to standard-setting processes and the content of organic standards points to limited deliberative capacity, there were other activities that demonstrated the democratization of export trade relationships. Foremost among these activities included the formation of smallholder group organic certification schemes.

To obtain organic certification, smallholders, and other farmers, are required to verify compliance with organic standards through detailed record keeping of farm activities. The imposition of an individualized audit model in the south has been widely critiqued (for example, see Mutersbaugh, 2002; Raynolds, 2004, 2012; Dolan, 2010). One agricultural consultant expressed his frustrations at what he (and others) understood to be the inappropriate ‘European model’ of organic certification. He was one of a number of people advocating for significant changes to pathways for organic compliance:

‘Early on, they were trying to use audit systems developed for EU large farmers rather than smallholders, so we ended up trying to develop something that was a bit more appropriate’ (Agricultural Consultant, Kampala, Uganda).
In East Africa (and elsewhere), there have been strong calls to restructure organic audit arrangements in ways that will enable them to more appropriately reflect the diverse and locally specific circumstances of smallholders. It is in this context that the impetus to develop a smallholder group certification scheme arose. Group certification is based on the organization of smallholders into groups, and with an organic certificate awarded to the group – and generally held by the export company – rather than individual smallholders. Management of the group occurs via an internal control system (ICS). The ICS employs an internal quality control document that stipulates requirements related to growing methods, post-harvest handling, record keeping and other activities.

This audit model has reduced the cost associated with organic certification, conditions that assist in explaining the recent increase in the numbers of certified organic smallholders in countries in the Global South (for example, see Lyons et al., 2012). Yet while this new smallholder-specific audit model has opened the way for the inclusion of smallholders in certified organic export trade, many farmers practising organic methods remain unable to join organic groups. Organic pineapple and coffee smallholders in Uganda, and cocoa producers in Ghana, for example, recounted stories of neighbours they knew who were unable to join their organic smallholder group, due to the limited quantity of certified organic produce their export buyer was able to take. The export buyer is responsible for deciding which smallholders are to be included as group members, circumstances that privilege exporters as determinants of the distribution of benefits associated with participation in organic exporting, as well as, at times, creating conditions for animosity and jealousy between smallholders.

Some smallholders who were members of organic groups also spoke of familial ties influencing purchasing arrangements within their group. Some pineapple producers in Uganda, for example, expressed frustration that certain group members were able to sell greater quantities of pineapples to the export buyer, than they were able themselves. They explained this as an outcome of local buyers showing preference for their family members. While a representative from Amfri Farms, an export buyer, explained that decision-making related to the distribution and quantity of purchases across group members was determined by smallholders’ capacity to comply with ‘quality’ indicators, including size and colour – not personal favours – some smallholders were not convinced by this explanation. Organic coffee producers who sold to Kawacom International raised similar concerns, citing favouritism amongst family members as a frequent factor in shaping organic coffee buying arrangements amongst their group members.

These concerns related to buying arrangements suggest that, while group certification has enabled the entry of large numbers of smallholders into organic export markets, at the same time smallholder groups demonstrate inequities that are manifest in a disproportionate distribution of benefits amongst smallholders. Export companies demonstrate significant power in determining the distribution of these benefits, given their opportunity to grant preference to some growers above others. Despite some attempts by export companies to make decisions related to their buying arrangements transparent, some growers describe these processes as shrouded in subterfuge; circumstances that are antithetical with the democratization of markets. In recent years, the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative also lamented the extent to which their buyer, Amfri Farms, has reduced the quantity of pineapples.
they purchase from the cooperative. This has created new pressures, and moments of conflict, between cooperative members.

There are other aspects of group certification that, while opening spaces for smallholder entry into organic export trading, have also constrained smallholders’ and other Southern actors’ capacity to negotiate the terms of their involvement, rendering them dependent upon their export buyer. For example, the export company holds the organic certificate, circumstances that result in recognition of smallholders’ organic status reliant upon the company they supply. On the one hand, smallholders identified a number of benefits associated with this arrangement, including a reliable market for the sale of their organic crops, the provision of extension services, training, equipment, and other materials for use on the farm (for example, see Lyons and Burch, 2007). Some organic coffee smallholders also spoke of the difficulties in finding a market for their coffee beans prior to the arrival of Kawacom. Without a local buyer for their coffee, some growers had resorted to crossing the border into Kenya – which they described as both dangerous and illegal – in the hopes of finding a market for their coffee beans. The arrival of Kawacom had, for many growers, simplified the pathway to market.

On the other hand, smallholders also argued that tying recognition of their organic status to an export company created unequal power relationships, including enabling export companies to ‘call all the shots’; including defining the terms of the relationship between themselves and their suppliers. Such findings are not unique to organic trade, and are commensurate more generally with other studies related to the impacts of contract farming in Africa (for example, see Barrientos and Dolan, 2006; Oya, 2012). Demonstrative of this inequitable relationship, Ugandan and Ghanaian smallholders described having little bargaining or negotiating power with their buyer. For example, some organic coffee and cocoa smallholders reported that their buyers did not always make payment for their organic crops within mutually agreed time frames. This was something to which smallholders had little recourse. A number of Ghanaian organic cocoa producers also spoke of frequent delays for payment for their crops. Such circumstances left smallholders economically vulnerable, and had adverse impacts for household food security, as well as the ability to pay for health and education related expenses. And yet, again, these were circumstances they described as having had few options to resist or respond to.

Similarly, coffee smallholders at Sipi Falls in Uganda expressed frustrations with what they described as ‘empty promises’ – or unfulfilled commitments – they had heard over the years from their buyer, Kawacom International. For example, many coffee smallholders spoke of Kawacom’s commitment to supply tarpaulins for utilization during coffee drying, and lamented that only a few households in the community had ever received these, and those that had been provided were now worn and required replacement. Yet despite this frustration, they described feeling powerless to respond, given their dependence on Kawacom for the sale of their coffee.

Smallholders in Uganda also described situations where buyers rejected their organic produce on the basis of their failure to comply with market requirements. On a visit to the Katuulu Organic Pineapple Cooperative in Uganda, for example, one smallholder presented a number of tattered black-and-white photocopies of photos that showed produce (pineapples and bananas) that were described by their export buyer as non-compliant with export standards. The bananas had some marks on the skin, and the pineapples were reported to be a larger size than market requirements. The export buyer, Amfri Farms, provided these photos as indicators of poor quality.
Yet these photos had engendered both confusion and anger amongst smallholders, with one farmer despairing: ‘What do you Europeans want? We don’t know what you want? Only when our produce is not good enough do we find out what you don’t want.’ This smallholder’s concern was supported by others, who expressed frustration at the limited information made available related to organic production standards.

The arrangement on which group certification is based – with certification held with the export buyer rather than individual growers – clearly creates both opportunities and constraints for smallholders, and with mixed impacts in terms of democratizing market relations. On the one hand, smallholders appear relegated to the margins, occupying the role of price-takers and recipients of export company scattered and inconsistent offerings – often under the banner of corporate social responsibility – and with little deliberative capacity to negotiate the terms of their relationship with their buyer.

Yet this is not the only story. In one instance, for example, the Katuulo organic smallholder group was able to counterbalance inequitable producer–exporter South–North power relationships. The bargaining power of this smallholder group was evident in the range of beneficial socio-economic outcomes members of the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative were able to negotiate with their export buyer, Amfri Farms. Members of the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative had, in recent years, negotiated an arrangement with Amfri Farms to assist in transport of produce to local markets. Prior to negotiating this arrangement, smallholders travelled via foot, or in a few cases, via bicycle, to deliver produce to local markets. According to some smallholders from the Cooperative, the provision of transport arrangements by Amfri Farms had eliminated – or at least reduced – a time-consuming and physically demanding task from their workload. In addition, Amfri Farms have also provided various supports related to the construction of a community health clinic; including transport of building materials. In explaining their decision to support the health clinic, a representative from Amfri Farms stated it was in the interest of their company to support ongoing social and community development at Katuulo, as well as at their other organic farming community sites. While Amfri Farms’ support for the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative demonstrates an extension of their corporate social responsibility mandate, there was also evidence to suggest the bargaining power of the cooperative was instrumental in shaping the form of these supports.

For example, the Katuulo organic smallholder group’s capacity to negotiate with Amfri Farms was described by both smallholders and Amfri Farms’ representatives as being assisted by their long-standing existence, as well as their formalized structure of governance with elected representatives, regular meetings, and a cooperative bank account and communal savings plan. A representative from Amfri Farms stated the cooperative structure, as well as other attributes of the group, readied them for compliance with group certification processes required for both organic and Fairtrade certifications. He also emphasized the benefits and simplicity of working with an already formed cooperative, especially in terms of ensuring compliance with the internal control system. He described the Katuulo Cooperative as ‘effective and coordinated’, and one of their ‘best groups’ of organic smallholders. He also stated the company ‘relied’ – indeed ‘depended’ – upon ‘good farmers’, including members of the Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative, to ensure the regular supply of quality fresh fruit to their international buyers. While Katuulo was one of their
most remote suppliers (over 200 kilometres from Kampala, where Amfri Farms dries and packages fruit prior to export from Entebbe International Airport), representatives from Amfri Farms explained that the cost associated with extra travel was more than compensated by the benefits of working with this cooperative.

In other words, on the basis of their cooperative structure and associated organizational capacity, the Katulu smallholder group demonstrated some bargaining power in deliberations with their buyer. Such deliberative capacities indicate the ‘opening up’ of negotiations in ways that may assist, more broadly, to democratize organic markets. Yet the decline in sales from Katulu by Amfri Farms in recent years raises questions about the long-term bargaining power of this group of smallholder farmers.

In addition to the introduction of smallholder group certification providing new opportunities for deliberative capacity, the introduction of domestic organic inspection arrangements also provides a site to examine the extent to which organic governance might align with democratic governing principles. To date, most organic inspection for compliance with organic standards in the global south is undertaken by international inspectors (including IMO, EcoCert and SKAL) (Barrett et al., 2002; Arora et al., 2013). This arrangement is costly, as well as raising a number of cross-cultural challenges related to the interpretation of standards. In 2004 in Uganda, UgoCert – and along with support from a number of other national and international organizations – was successful in obtaining international recognition to conduct local inspection.9 The development of a joint inspection protocol in Uganda – whereby local inspectors undertake inspection on behalf of international certifiers – has provided a precedent for the establishment of domestic inspection protocols for the recently drafted Regional Organic Agriculture Standard in East Africa, as well as inspection processes in other African nations. While the discussion above indicates (at least to date, but this something that may be expected to shift over time) the Ugandan organic sector has achieved little in terms of shaping the content of organic standards, the introduction of domestic inspection opens spaces for local actors to engage as moral arbiters in the interpretation and implementation of organic standards.

There is strong support among some Southern actors for the use of local inspectors, with growing pressures exerted on export companies to utilize local inspectors, including funding from EPOPA contingent upon the use of local inspectors:

‘Many operators here in Uganda are actually putting pressure on their certifiers to use the local inspectors, so that the costs can be reduced. So, many of the operators are refusing to meet the costs of flying in an inspector from the UK, or Germany’ (EPOPA Representative, Kampala, Uganda).

Both smallholder group certification and the introduction of local inspection services have created spaces for smallholders and other Southern actors to negotiate the inclusion of local priorities. These spaces for civic engagement signify opportunities for the participation of Southern actors in deliberations and other decision-making processes related to global organic agriculture governance and trade.

The results presented here suggest smallholders who are members of a farm cooperative prior to their entry into certified organic export trade can be expected to have significant capacities that equip them to bargain with their export buyer. Cooperative, and other forms of collective organizing, signifies strategies to maintain and extend the ‘cracks’ in organic governance arrangements in which Southern actors
are able to negotiate their interests. Yet there is much work to be done in this regard, given many cooperatives were disbanded in Uganda, and elsewhere, alongside neo-liberal agriculture reform (Wiegratz, 2010).

This research also demonstrates smallholder groups with fewer members have been able to ensure greater transparency and accountability (including relating to purchasing arrangements), in comparison to larger groups. Members of the Katulu Organic Pineapple Cooperative, for example, could at least identify who the favoured suppliers in their group were, and had initiated a process to ensure that, throughout the course of the growing season, each cooperative member was provided with an opportunity to sell additional pineapples. In contrast, coffee growers at Sipi Falls – with group membership of over 3,000 smallholder farmers – did not know all the members in their cooperative, and had little access to knowledge related to the purchasing arrangements across this large membership base.

Smallholders’ bargaining power also appeared to be related to their proximity to markets. Organic growers with limited market opportunities – including organic coffee growers at Sipi Falls in Uganda, for example – were tied to Kawacom International, both geographically and contractually, given the organic certificate was held with the company. This dependence closed down smallholders’ opportunities to negotiate, for fear of losing their market altogether. Circumstances were similar for organic oil palm producers under contract with the Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC). Out-growers under contract with the GOPDC described themselves as having little room to manoeuvre in terms of their buying arrangements. These growers were tied to the GOPDC via a 20-year contractual arrangement. If oil palm growers broke their contract, they not only lost access to a market for their oil palm, they also lost the land on which their oil palm was farmed. Under such circumstances, smallholders had few options, and little deliberative capacity, to negotiate with their buyer.

**Conclusions: Organic Governance and Opportunities for Democratic Engagement?**

Global rural development and the corporate food regime have driven an export agriculture agenda that has delivered food insecurity and social and ecological problems for the Global South. This food crisis also intersects with the contemporary fuel and climate crises. The expansion of export-led organic markets in the Global South raises tensions amongst supporters of alternative agri-food initiatives related to the extent to which this pathway for rural development – driven by development agencies, corporate actors, parts of the organic movement, Northern consumers and others – might perpetuate the same inequities and injustices. Amongst these includes concerns organic exporting will simply replicate unfair and ecologically fragile South–North relations that have come to underpin conventional trade, as well as rendering organic smallholders dependent upon the whims of both the global machinations of organic governance regimes, as well as a broad range of Northern stakeholder interests (including retailers, consumers, etc). In a context of rising food prices, such circumstances may be expected to worsen food insecurity and food crises for exporting Southern nations.

This article contributes to this debate by problematizing South–North relations through an examination of the nuanced relationships that emerge within, and across, diverse technologies of organic governance. In particular, the article has sought to
contribute to debates related to the extent to which the technologies of organic governance – on which export trade relies – might provide new opportunities for deliberative capacity, thereby democratizing South–North organic export market relationships? This article has focused on Uganda and Ghana due to the centrality of the African continent to broader debates about organics and the future of food – given the continents’ rapidly expanding certified organic agriculture sector.

This article has examined the extent to which organic governance arrangements demonstrate and/or facilitate deliberative capacity amongst Southern actors, particularly smallholder farmers. Here, deliberative capacity is taken as one measure for the democratization of deliberative processes that underpin market relations. This article has examined three aspects of organic governance, including organic standard setting, group certification and local inspection processes.

The results presented paint a mixed picture. On the one hand, Ugandan and Ghanaian smallholders, and other local actors, have been limited in the extent to which they have been able to shape organic governance arrangements and their outcomes. While some Ugandan actors participate in standard-setting processes, they have gained little ground in terms of shaping the actual content of organic standards. Rather, the results presented here demonstrate that processes to define the socio-economic and ecological conditions of certified organic agriculture have largely been captured by Northern stakeholder interests. Group certification has also, in some instances, created new forms of dependency between smallholders and export buyers, circumstances that are maintained by the opacity of various aspects of organic governance arrangements. Ugandan and Ghanaian actors lament that new forms of participation and inclusion are constrained by inequitable power relations, including between smallholders, certifiers, export buyers and retailers. As a result, Southern actors describe being at the whims of local and international export buyers. But this is not the only story.

At the same time, Ugandan and Ghanaian smallholders, farm and civil society organizations (and often in collaboration with other Southern and Northern actors) have succeeded in shaping some aspects of organic governance arrangements, including the introduction of a smallholder group certification scheme, and via the introduction of local inspectors. There was also evidence of smallholder groups negotiating with their buyers in ways that were delivering outcomes that reflected smallholders’ needs and interests. Such activities – albeit small, compared to broader trends in the organic and conventional agri-food sectors – represent moments of deliberative capacity, and may signify further ruptures in the corporate food regime.

These ‘cracks’ are opportunities for the democratization of organic governance processes. On the basis of research presented here, certified organic exporting from the Global South, and the technologies of organic governance on which it relies, demonstrate small, and precarious, moments of democratic engagement. Widening these ‘cracks’, thereby normalising inclusivity, transparency, as well as meaningful and deep engagement with Southern actors – in other words, facilitating deliberative capacity – will be a necessary precursor to ensure certified organic exporting might play a part in building a democratic food future.

Notes
1. Alongside increasing dependence on food imports in the Global South, their cost is also estimated to have risen by 11% in 2010, and by up to 20% for low-income food-deficit countries (FAO, 2010).
2. Amongst these food sovereignty movements includes seed saving, women’s cooperatives, the formation of local food and farming networks, as well as opposition to genetic engineering and inappropriate forms of food aid (Holt Giménez et al., 2009).

3. The debate that followed this proposal by the UK Soil Association highlighted the potential discord in marrying organic farming and international rural development agendas, particularly in the context of concerns about climate change, peak oil and local food security. Yet at the same time, others responded with concerns that African smallholders were being asked to carry the burden of responses to climate change, a position that was frequently articulated in media headlines, including claims that ‘effort(s) to curb climate change may hurt African farms’ (Clayton, 2007).

4. While the African continent was self-sufficient in food through the 1960s, and between 1966 and 1970 was a net exporter, by 2008 the continent was importing 25% of its food (Holt Giménez et al., 2009).

5. It is likely the non-certified organic sector in Africa is much larger than the certified organic sector; however, data related to the former are limited at present.

6. Amongst the little research in this area includes Raynolds et al. (2007) examination of the role of civil society organisations in shaping new organic governance arrangements.

7. It can be expected that these events will be increasingly attended by Southern stakeholders, given that 75% of IFOAM’s membership base is now located in the global south (Raynolds, 2004).

8. The Katuulo Organic Pineapple Cooperative is demonstrative of Uganda’s long history of cooperative forms of organizing, although Uganda’s economic reforms since the 1980s have been associated with the dismantling of many (see Wiegratz, 2010).

9. There are only few countries in the global south that have achieved recognition for domestic inspectors to undertake organic inspection, and amongst these include Brazil, China, Egypt, Nicaragua and Peru (Barrett et al., 2002).

References


